Disarming Kuki-Zo armed groups under Suspension of Operation pact
|
Oinam Nabakishore Singh
In the wake of eruption of violence in Manipur, the Army, Assam Rifles, BSF, CRPF and other Central force personnel are deployed all along the imaginary buffer zone in the foothills to prevent crossing of boundary by either armed group to carry out attacks on the other side. In spite of their presence, there have been many instances where Kuki Zo armed militants sneaked past them and killed innocent villagers at Wangoo Sabal, Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou and Saiton in Bishenpur district last year, 2024. There have been many other instances of intermittent firing by Kuki armed militants on Meitei settlements at Koutruk and Kadangband in Imphal West district and Thamnapokpi, Sabungkhok, Sanasabi and Sinam Meitei villages in Imphal East causing injuries and even death. Use of drones and rockets to drop bombs and explosives at Koutruk and Moirang by armed Kuki militants goes on to prove the upgradation of armaments.
After the outbreak of the conflict on the 3rd May, 2023, the Central Government was quick in dispatching Central Armed Police to stop further escalation of the conflict and casualty. It is estimated that some 60,000 personnel of Army, Assam Rifles, Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force are now deployed in the State to help in maintenance of law and order in the State. After vacation of Kuki-Zo areas by Meitei settlers and Imphal valley by the Kuki-Zo members, the priority of the Central force was to prevent crossing of the so-called buffer zone, which runs along the foothills at the periphery of Imphal valley, by members of either community to the area of the other community.
By now, it is more or less clear that the job of the Central forces is to prevent any further violence by the armed groups on either side. They are not seen as enemy by any of the Central forces in the present conflict, although there have been a few instances where some personnel of Central forces suffered casualty and became martyrs due to firing by Kuki-Zo militants. In an unfortunate incident, when Kuki-Zo armed militants fired upon an armoured vehicle of the CRPF while attempting to attack the relief camp of Meitei at Jukardhor in Jiribam district on the 10th November, 2024, ten of their members died in retaliation from the CRPF. It was a sporadic incidence. By and large, there has be no exchange of fire between Central forces and armed groups of either community.
Historically, at the instance of Assam Rifles, some 25 armed militant groups belonging to Kuki-Zo community, signed Suspension of Operation (SoO), a ceasefire agreement, with the former in 2005. Later on, Central and Manipur Governments signed the SoO agreement, which requires extension from time to time after review, with leaders of the armed Kuki-Zo militants in August, 2008 with the clearly stated preamble that integrity of Manipur is non-negotiable. Such agreement will be welcome by one and all as laying down of arms by the cadres is expected to prevent any further violence between them and Central and State forces or violence among cadres of groups. However, it looks paradoxical to seek an arrangement of a ceasefire between the Central and State forces on one side and armed groups of Kuki-Zo community when there was no instance of conflict between them. The arrangement of SoO may be seen to be buying peace by the Central Government by paying some grants and monthly maintenance sum to the militants, and paving the way for peaceful settlement through negotiation. However, the ultimate goal of establishment of a new Kukiland for the Kuki-Zo militants has been uppermost in the mind of leaders of armed Kukis. From the perspective of Assam Rifles, which is mainly tasked to engage in counter-insurgency operation in North East India, arrangement of SoO is a good positive step as any demand for Kukiland is considered to be in the domain political settlement between Government and armed groups. Such ceasefire agreements have been signed with many armed groups in the North East resulting in de-escalation of violence and conflict.
In the present ongoing conflict in Manipur, the armed Kuki-Zo militants, who signed SoO, have been in the forefront right from the onset of violence as early as 10th March, 2023, when they are alleged by Manipur Government to be instigator of the protests on that day in Kangpokpi, Churachandpur and Tengnoupal districts. A few police personnel sustained injuries while trying to control the protest at Kangpokpi. Suspecting the role of cadres under SoO, Manipur Government immediately decided to pull out of SoO with armed Kuki-Zo militants by adopting a resolution in Cabinet meeting held on the 10th March, 2023. This decision added fuel to fire as it antagonized the signatories of SoO, Kuki Zo militants. However, the Central Government did not endorse the decision of the State Cabinet as ceasefire was seen as a significant achievement to avoid any casualty. Violation of ground rules of not recruiting new cadres and keeping the arms away under lock and key have been blatantly flouted by the cadres. On the unfortunate day of eruption of violence on the 3rd May, 2023, brandishing of weapons in the protest and assault on Meitei settlements in Churachandpur and elsewhere and engagement with Meitei armed groups for the last twenty months prove beyond any doubt that SoO signatories belonging to Kuki-Zo community have violated ground rules of SoO.
A question is raised by many experts as to whether the Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project in Myanmar is holding the Central Government back from cracking down on Kuki-Zo militants. This project is entirely funded by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India for strategic, bilateral relation with Myanmar and economic reasons for the North East.
The North East India is connected to the rest of the country through the so-called narrow chicken neck having a width of just 28 kilometres at Siliguri in West Bengal. There is a possibility of cutting off the entire North East from rest of India by China in the event of a war with India. In such an eventuality, supplies including arms and ammunition by road to the North East India would be disrupted, which would lead to a disadvantageous situation for India. Therefore, India requires an alternative land route to access the North East. India also needs to further its bilateral ties with Myanmar, where China has heavily invested in construction of infrastructure like road, port, special economic zone and pipeline for oil and gas.
Kaladan multi modal transit transport project comprises of three components-redevelopment of Sittwe port in Rakhine State on Bay of Bengal to allow docking of ships from Kolkata, dredging of Kaladan river in Rakhine State to make it navigable, and construction of a greenfield road from Paletwa in Rakhine State to Juringpui at the border of Mizoram and onward to Aizawl through Chin State, where Chin people live. The project is at an advanced stage of execution. Redevelopment of port at Sittwe and dredging of Kaladan river have been completed. Only construction of new road through jungles in Chin State and Mizoram is incomplete. It is a common knowledge that Kuki-Zo communities in Manipur, Mizoram and Chin people in Chin State of Myanmar are of the same ethnicity and familial bonding, and they share similarities in language, traditions and culture. In fact, the present Kuki-Zo people in Manipur have migrated from Chin State directly or through Mizoram over the past hundreds of years and recently. Any strict action by the Central forces against the Kuki-Zo armed militants in Manipur will have backlash in the execution of Kaladan multi-modal transit project as the Chin people there may harbor resentment against the Union Government and consequently impact completion of the project. The need for cooperation of Chin people in Myanmar will be appreciated all the more as the writ of Myanmar military Government does not run in most areas of Chin and Rakhine States now as armed ethnic groups of these two States have captured most of the territory and military posts there. In such a situation, it is in the strategic interest of India to recognize the need for having peace with Kuki-Zo people in Manipur. Further, the instability in Myanmar and possible break-up of Myanmar along ethnic lines will put Chin State as an important neighbour while looking at geopolitics of the region.
Perception of the ongoing conflict as ethnic conflict by Union Home Minister in an oversimplified manner will not allow any forceful action to be taken against armed militants of Kuki-Zo community. The solution to the conflict, according to Union Home Minister, lies in removal of mistrust and hatred between the two communities. It does not prescribe any use of force on either side to disarm the armed militant groups who stand ever ready to kill each other from across the buffer zone.
It may not be forgotten that to remove a thorn stuck on one’s foot, one must use a pointed needle. So long as Kuki Zo communities are armed, they would not allow any unarmed civil leaders to express their opinion on the conflict freely. Kuki Zo civil society organizations like All Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum based in Churachandpur have openly expressed that Government of India should talk only with armed militants, who signed SoO, which leaves the larger public leaders out of any talks to find solution to the problem. Such approach resembles the talks between NSCN (IM) and Government of India, which is yet to find an acceptable solution even after 27 years of signing the ceasefire agreement in 1997. Will Government of India allow armed Kuki-Zo militants to talk to them from a position of strength without disarming them first ? Without extension of SoO since the 29th February, 2024, is it possible to engage in talks with those armed militants ? Can they represent Kuki-Zo community at all ?
The writer is a former Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur & a retired IAS officer.
In the wake of eruption of violence in Manipur, the Army, Assam Rifles, BSF, CRPF and other Central force personnel are deployed all along the imaginary buffer zone in the foothills to prevent crossing of boundary by either armed group to carry out attacks on the other side. In spite of their presence, there have been many instances where Kuki Zo armed militants sneaked past them and killed innocent villagers at Wangoo Sabal, Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou and Saiton in Bishenpur district last year, 2024. There have been many other instances of intermittent firing by Kuki armed militants on Meitei settlements at Koutruk and Kadangband in Imphal West district and Thamnapokpi, Sabungkhok, Sanasabi and Sinam Meitei villages in Imphal East causing injuries and even death. Use of drones and rockets to drop bombs and explosives at Koutruk and Moirang by armed Kuki militants goes on to prove the upgradation of armaments.
After the outbreak of the conflict on the 3rd May, 2023, the Central Government was quick in dispatching Central Armed Police to stop further escalation of the conflict and casualty. It is estimated that some 60,000 personnel of Army, Assam Rifles, Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force are now deployed in the State to help in maintenance of law and order in the State. After vacation of Kuki-Zo areas by Meitei settlers and Imphal valley by the Kuki-Zo members, the priority of the Central force was to prevent crossing of the so-called buffer zone, which runs along the foothills at the periphery of Imphal valley, by members of either community to the area of the other community.
By now, it is more or less clear that the job of the Central forces is to prevent any further violence by the armed groups on either side. They are not seen as enemy by any of the Central forces in the present conflict, although there have been a few instances where some personnel of Central forces suffered casualty and became martyrs due to firing by Kuki-Zo militants. In an unfortunate incident, when Kuki-Zo armed militants fired upon an armoured vehicle of the CRPF while attempting to attack the relief camp of Meitei at Jukardhor in Jiribam district on the 10th November, 2024, ten of their members died in retaliation from the CRPF. It was a sporadic incidence. By and large, there has be no exchange of fire between Central forces and armed groups of either community.
Historically, at the instance of Assam Rifles, some 25 armed militant groups belonging to Kuki-Zo community, signed Suspension of Operation (SoO), a ceasefire agreement, with the former in 2005. Later on, Central and Manipur Governments signed the SoO agreement, which requires extension from time to time after review, with leaders of the armed Kuki-Zo militants in August, 2008 with the clearly stated preamble that integrity of Manipur is non-negotiable. Such agreement will be welcome by one and all as laying down of arms by the cadres is expected to prevent any further violence between them and Central and State forces or violence among cadres of groups. However, it looks paradoxical to seek an arrangement of a ceasefire between the Central and State forces on one side and armed groups of Kuki-Zo community when there was no instance of conflict between them. The arrangement of SoO may be seen to be buying peace by the Central Government by paying some grants and monthly maintenance sum to the militants, and paving the way for peaceful settlement through negotiation. However, the ultimate goal of establishment of a new Kukiland for the Kuki-Zo militants has been uppermost in the mind of leaders of armed Kukis. From the perspective of Assam Rifles, which is mainly tasked to engage in counter-insurgency operation in North East India, arrangement of SoO is a good positive step as any demand for Kukiland is considered to be in the domain political settlement between Government and armed groups. Such ceasefire agreements have been signed with many armed groups in the North East resulting in de-escalation of violence and conflict.
In the present ongoing conflict in Manipur, the armed Kuki-Zo militants, who signed SoO, have been in the forefront right from the onset of violence as early as 10th March, 2023, when they are alleged by Manipur Government to be instigator of the protests on that day in Kangpokpi, Churachandpur and Tengnoupal districts. A few police personnel sustained injuries while trying to control the protest at Kangpokpi. Suspecting the role of cadres under SoO, Manipur Government immediately decided to pull out of SoO with armed Kuki-Zo militants by adopting a resolution in Cabinet meeting held on the 10th March, 2023. This decision added fuel to fire as it antagonized the signatories of SoO, Kuki Zo militants. However, the Central Government did not endorse the decision of the State Cabinet as ceasefire was seen as a significant achievement to avoid any casualty. Violation of ground rules of not recruiting new cadres and keeping the arms away under lock and key have been blatantly flouted by the cadres. On the unfortunate day of eruption of violence on the 3rd May, 2023, brandishing of weapons in the protest and assault on Meitei settlements in Churachandpur and elsewhere and engagement with Meitei armed groups for the last twenty months prove beyond any doubt that SoO signatories belonging to Kuki-Zo community have violated ground rules of SoO.
A question is raised by many experts as to whether the Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project in Myanmar is holding the Central Government back from cracking down on Kuki-Zo militants. This project is entirely funded by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India for strategic, bilateral relation with Myanmar and economic reasons for the North East.
The North East India is connected to the rest of the country through the so-called narrow chicken neck having a width of just 28 kilometres at Siliguri in West Bengal. There is a possibility of cutting off the entire North East from rest of India by China in the event of a war with India. In such an eventuality, supplies including arms and ammunition by road to the North East India would be disrupted, which would lead to a disadvantageous situation for India. Therefore, India requires an alternative land route to access the North East. India also needs to further its bilateral ties with Myanmar, where China has heavily invested in construction of infrastructure like road, port, special economic zone and pipeline for oil and gas.
Kaladan multi modal transit transport project comprises of three components-redevelopment of Sittwe port in Rakhine State on Bay of Bengal to allow docking of ships from Kolkata, dredging of Kaladan river in Rakhine State to make it navigable, and construction of a greenfield road from Paletwa in Rakhine State to Juringpui at the border of Mizoram and onward to Aizawl through Chin State, where Chin people live. The project is at an advanced stage of execution. Redevelopment of port at Sittwe and dredging of Kaladan river have been completed. Only construction of new road through jungles in Chin State and Mizoram is incomplete. It is a common knowledge that Kuki-Zo communities in Manipur, Mizoram and Chin people in Chin State of Myanmar are of the same ethnicity and familial bonding, and they share similarities in language, traditions and culture. In fact, the present Kuki-Zo people in Manipur have migrated from Chin State directly or through Mizoram over the past hundreds of years and recently. Any strict action by the Central forces against the Kuki-Zo armed militants in Manipur will have backlash in the execution of Kaladan multi-modal transit project as the Chin people there may harbor resentment against the Union Government and consequently impact completion of the project. The need for cooperation of Chin people in Myanmar will be appreciated all the more as the writ of Myanmar military Government does not run in most areas of Chin and Rakhine States now as armed ethnic groups of these two States have captured most of the territory and military posts there. In such a situation, it is in the strategic interest of India to recognize the need for having peace with Kuki-Zo people in Manipur. Further, the instability in Myanmar and possible break-up of Myanmar along ethnic lines will put Chin State as an important neighbour while looking at geopolitics of the region.
Perception of the ongoing conflict as ethnic conflict by Union Home Minister in an oversimplified manner will not allow any forceful action to be taken against armed militants of Kuki-Zo community. The solution to the conflict, according to Union Home Minister, lies in removal of mistrust and hatred between the two communities. It does not prescribe any use of force on either side to disarm the armed militant groups who stand ever ready to kill each other from across the buffer zone.
It may not be forgotten that to remove a thorn stuck on one’s foot, one must use a pointed needle. So long as Kuki Zo communities are armed, they would not allow any unarmed civil leaders to express their opinion on the conflict freely. Kuki Zo civil society organizations like All Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum based in Churachandpur have openly expressed that Government of India should talk only with armed militants, who signed SoO, which leaves the larger public leaders out of any talks to find solution to the problem. Such approach resembles the talks between NSCN (IM) and Government of India, which is yet to find an acceptable solution even after 27 years of signing the ceasefire agreement in 1997. Will Government of India allow armed Kuki-Zo militants to talk to them from a position of strength without disarming them first ? Without extension of SoO since the 29th February, 2024, is it possible to engage in talks with those armed militants ? Can they represent Kuki-Zo community at all ?
The writer is a former Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur & a retired IAS officer.