Collective responsibility of the Cabinet in Parliamentary democracy : A focus on India

Y Devendro Singh
A core principle of Parliamentary democracy is the collective accountability of the Cabinet, or Council of Ministers, to the popularly elected House. The Government needs to retain majority support in this House to stay in power. When required, it must prove its strength by either passing a Motion of Confidence to gain the House's trust or by successfully opposing a No-confidence Motion moved by Opposition parties.
In India, collectively accountability of the Council of Ministers is to the Lok Sabha at the Union level and to the Legislative Assembly at the State level, with this responsibility being both joint and indivisible. The Constitution does not explicitly define the individual responsibility of a Minister or their accountability to Parliament or the State Legislative Assembly for any acts of omission or commission within their departmental responsibilities. Nevertheless, adhering to high Parliamentary traditions, individual Ministers have willingly accepted responsibility and resigned in response to criticisms or shortcomings in their respective departments.
The concept of collective responsibility is a fundamental pillar of Parliamentary democracy, ensuring that the Council of Ministers, or the Cabinet, functions as a cohesive entity answerable to the popularly elected House. AV Dicey, a renowned British jurist and leading Constitutional theorist, affirms that this principle is crucial for maintaining the Cabinet's confidence in the legislature, particularly the lower House at the Union level and the State Legislative Assembly at the State level, to govern effectively. As Dicey highlights in his work "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution," without majority support, a Government's ability to lead is compromised, underscoring the essentiality of garnering trust within the Parliament.
Walter Bagehot, in his seminal work "The English Constitution," elaborates on this principle, observing that the coherence of the Cabinet underlies its ability to steer National policy and command a majority. If required, this strength must be evidenced on the floor of the House either through a Motion of Confidence, which confirms the support of the majority, or by defeating a No-confidence Motion initiated by Opposition factions, which challenges the Government's mandate to rule.
Collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha is both joint and indivisible, as observed by Granville Austin in "The Indian Constitution : Cornerstone of a Nation." Austin notes that while the Indian Constitution doesn't explicitly delineate the individual accountability of Ministers within the broader framework, high Parliamentary traditions have evolved. Ministers often shoulder the blame for departmental failings or controversies, an unwritten rule that fosters personal accountability within collective governance.
For instance, scholars like Professor MP Jain in "Indian Constitutional Law" have documented instances where Ministers, adhering to these unwritten codes, have resigned in light of departmental criticisms or failures, reinforcing a tradition of responsibility that enhances democratic governance. This culture of individual accountability, while not Constitutionally enshrined, emerges from a robust tradition of Parliamentary decorum and integrity.
Through these academic perspectives and historical precedents, the doctrine of collective responsibility, coupled with voluntary Ministerial accountability, emerges as fundamental to maintaining coherent and stable democratic governance.
MN Kaul and SL Shakdhar, in their authoritative work "Practice and Procedure of Parliament," provide an extensive discussion on the principle of collective responsibility within the context of the Indian Parliamentary system. They articulate that the Council of Ministers, functioning as a singular entity, is held collectively accountable to the Lok Sabha. This collective responsibility ensures that the Cabinet acts with a unified voice, reflecting the majority will of the elected representatives and thereby maintaining the trust vested in them by the electorate.
Kaul and Shakdhar explain that this principle compels the Government to demonstrate its command over the Lok Sabha, particularly in times of political uncertainty or challenge. The Government must either secure a Motion of Confidence, signifying its support within the House, or successfully counter a No-confidence Motion brought forth by the Opposition, which tests the majority's confidence.
Further, they highlight that while the Constitution does not explicitly provide for individual Ministerial responsibility in terms of acts of omission or commission, there exists a convention, deeply ingrained within Indian Parliamentary practice, wherein Ministers often assume responsibility for the actions and failures of their respective departments. This convention, as Kaul and Shakdhar note, aligns with the broader commitment to maintaining the integrity and accountability of the Government, even when such accountability is not specifically mandated by Constitutional text.
By covering these topics, MN Kaul and SL Shakdhar's text serves as an essential resource for understanding the nuances of Parliamentary procedure and the unwritten conventions that underpin the practice of collective and individual responsibility in India's Parliamentary democracy.
Numerous examples illustrate individual Ministerial resignations due to policy disagreements or departmental failures. For instance, Dr SP Mookerjee, the Union Minister of Industry and Supply, resigned due to the "weak, halting, and inconsistent" stance taken by the Government in response to the "brutalities" allegedly faced by Hindu minorities in Pakistan (P Deb., 19-4-1950, pp. 3017-22). Dr John Matthai, the Union Minister of Finance, resigned because of differences with the Prime Minister regarding "fundamental principles of policy," particularly over the formation of the Planning Commission, which the Finance Minister deemed "ill-timed and ill-conceived" (Hindu, 1-6-1950 and 3-6-1950). Mahavir Tyagi, the Minister of Rehabilitation, resigned on 15 January 1966 due to disagreements over the signing of the Tashkent Agreement. MC Chagla, the Minister of External Affairs, resigned on 5 September 1967 because of his disagreement with the Government's education policy. Asoka Mehta, the Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals, resigned on 22 August 1968 due to differences over the Government’s policy on the Czechoslovakian issue (LS Deb, 26-8-1968, cc. 1649-51). Morarji Desai, Deputy Prime Minister, resigned on 16 July 1969 as a protest against being "summarily relieved" of the Finance portfolio (LS Deb., 21-7-1969, cc. 280-84). Mohan Dharia, the Minister of State for Works and Housing, resigned on 2nd March 1975 due to his differences with the Prime Minister about having a National dialogue and consensus on pressing issues (LS Deb, 5-3-1975, cc. 241-54).
While many resignations are voluntary, there have been occasions when Ministers resigned at the Prime Minister’s request in India. On October 15, 1969, the then Prime Minister of India, Smt Indira Gandhi asked for the resignation of four Ministers, which were duly tendered. This highlights that collective responsibility sometimes involves enforcing discipline within the Cabinet to ensure cohesive governance.
In the present context of Manipur, it is essential to emphasize the collective responsibility of the Cabinet Council, led by the Chief Minister, in addressing the State's critical situation. Effective governance relies on the ability of Council of Ministers to work together and share responsibilities and expertise. The principles of collective responsibility emphasize that the Council operates as a unified entity, holding itself accountable to the State's Legislative Assembly.
In this challenging period, it is imperative for the Cabinet, under the Chief Minister's leadership, to ensure transparent communication and decisive action that reflects the confidence and trust of the elected representatives and, by extension, the citizens of Manipur. The situation demands that the Cabinet collectively stands by the decisions taken to address the current issues, presenting a cohesive front to effectively govern and navigate these difficulties.
Furthermore, individual Ministers should be prepared to either align with the collective decisions or, if in significant disagreement, consider the standard course of resignation to maintain the integrity of the collective responsibility. Overall, the Chief Minister and the Cabinet's adherence to these principles is crucial for maintaining stability and fostering public confidence during this critical time in Manipur.
In short, collective responsibility is upheld through the enforcement of two key principles: first, no individual is appointed to the Council without the recommendation of the Prime Minister in the Union Cabinet or the Chief Minister in the State Cabinet. Second, no person remains a member of the Council if the Prime Minister for the Union Cabinet or the Chief Minister for the State Cabinet demands their dismissal.
In conclusion, the only option for a Minister who does not see eye-to-eye with the Prime Minister in the Union Cabinet, or the Chief Minister in the State Cabinet, on matters of policy or is not unwilling to defend a Cabinet decision, is to resign. Similarly, if the
Prime Minister
or the Chief Minister
feels that a colleague’s views or actions are causing embarrassment, they can reasonably request that colleague’s resignation.


The writer is Joint Director, Manipur Legislative Assembly