Was there a need for SoO pact with Kuki-Zo armed groups ?
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Oinam Nabakishore Singh, IAS(Retd.)
Why did the Kuki-Zo community members form about thirty armed groups in Manipur since late 1980s ? Were they set up with the objective to create a separate territory from the Union of India outside India or to set up a separate Union Territory within Manipur State. It has been repeatedly heard from many Kuki leaders, especially, Dr Seilen Haokip, spokesperson of Kuki National Organization that Kukis are not against the Union Government and what they seek is a Separate Administration from the State Government of Manipur. In order to display loyalty publicly to the Union of India, Kuki people have been waving the National flag at any protest demonstrations since the violence erupted between Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities on the 3rd May, 2023.
In late 1980s and early 1990s when some Kuki-Zo youths armed themselves with sophisticated weapons, general assumption is that they would be fighting against the security forces as the Naga and Meitei armed youths have been engaging the Central forces.
It is common in Manipur to see armed groups extort money from contractors, businessmen, employees, transporters, etc in the name of purported separatist movement to achieve independence from the Union of India. Out of fear of consequences for non-compliance with monetary demands, many who receive demand letters enter into negotiation with cadres of the armed groups to arrive at a settlement. In the event of non-payment, there have been instances where “punishments” have been meted out to those reluctant persons.
Shri Jarnail Singh, who was Chief Secretary of Manipur Government from 2004 to 2008, and who was actively involved in negotiation with Kuki militant groups, Kuki National Organization (KNO) and United Peoples Front (UPF) mentions at page 149 of his book, “My Tryst with Manipur: A Memoir” as “There were about a dozen Kuki militant groups operating in Manipur. Most of the time, they were responsible for hold-ups on highways and extortion threats to contractors. But these groups had not raised any secessionist demand. So, New Delhi felt there was a need to hold talks and redress their genuine grievances. It was decided that the talk should be between the State Government and Kuki militant groups.”
Funding of the Kuki-Zo militant groups could be from diverse sources. Drug trafficking from Myanmar to Manipur and further to other parts of India onwards has been going on for many decades. The open and porous border of 398 kms between Manipur and Myanmar has been used for trafficking of contraband items like arms, drugs, wild life products, gold and precious stones, etc. by people belonging to all communities in Manipur. It is not hard to conclude that anybody who is at the routes of illegal trade would have collected their share from the profit of the trade. Illegal trade help both traffickers and extortionist to enrich themselves. The incentive to set up a new armed militant group to extort money with meagre investment in arms was known to any discerning eye and as such there are now about thirty armed militant groups belonging to Kuki-Zo community. Out of the thirty, about twenty-five are in suspension of operation.
A relevant question to be asked is as to why Assam Rifles, which has presence in large number in Manipur, guarding the border with Myanmar chose to enter into a ceasefire with armed Kuki-Zo militants under the name and style of Suspension of Operation in 2005.
In fact, a ceasefire is a treaty between two warring groups to facilitate negotiations for a settlement between the parties involved. It has been made abundantly clear that Kuki-Zo militants were not secessionists, and perhaps had not attacked Central or State security forces before the signing of SoO agreements with Assam Rifles. On the other hand, both Naga and Meitei armed groups have been engaged in violence resulting in casualty to security personnel till ceasefire agreements are signed. Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) after several rounds of negotiations with emissaries of the Government of India in foreign countries, entered into ceasefire with the latter on the 1st August, 1997.
The cease-fire has been extended periodically for one year each time to allow negotiations to take place between the Government of India and NSCN (IM). The movement of the armed Nagas has been recognized as a political problem, which should be addressed through political dialogue. If the Kuki-Zo armed groups were not demanding secession from the Union of India, and if they were not engaged in any form of violence against the Central security forces like Army and Assam Rifles, what prompted Assam Rifles to sign SoO agreement with them in 2005. It may be recalled that during the Kuki-Naga clashes from 1993 to 1997, armed groups of both communities were on the forefront to protect their villages or attack on the villages of other community. Armed groups of Kuki-Zo communities emerged as protectors of their community and defence force against future conflict with other community. They earned respectability from the members of their community and justified their existence amidst them.
What does Assam Rifles achieve by signing SoO with Kuki-Zo armed groups ? The hands of Assam Rifles were full in 2005 with several Meitei insurgent groups operating from Myanmar could attack them. There were instances of a few skirmishes of Assam Rifles with cadres of NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) in the hills of Manipur and Nagaland. They have to weigh the pros and cons of signing a ceasefire with some twenty-five Kuki-Zo militants groups operating in Kangpokpi, Churachand-pur, Chandel, Tengnoupal and Moreh areas. They would have realized that these groups were not secessionist in their approach. However, they could turn secessionist when they gain more strength in future. In order to nip the possible secessionist movement in the bud, it makes sense for Assam Rifles to enter into a ceasefire, where the arms and ammunition of the armed groups are kept away under lock and key at designated camps, which would be monitored by them from time to time. Only cost to Union Government under the SoO agreement is one-time payment of a lump-sum amount to each cadre to start a new life in the mainstream and monthly payment of a paltry amount of about Rs 5000-6000. The benefits of ceasefire far outweigh the costs.
While the political aspects of SoO have not been explicitly spelt out in the agreement, both the Union Government and armed Kuki-Zo militants had perhaps tacit understanding about political demand for formation of a new Kukiland out of Manipur. This has been made clear by the utterances of political leaders of ruling party and armed Kuki-Zo groups. However, it was made explicit in the SoO agreement that there would be no demand for disintegration of Manipur.
With regard to the first negotiations with KNO and UPF, Shri Jarnail Singh, former Chief Secretary of Manipur Govern- ment mentions at ibid page 150, as “The KNO wanted the discussion with a representative of the Home Ministry but we (team led by Chief Secretary) were firm that they needed to speak to a team led by Chief Secretary of Manipur only. The talks centred on general issues of equitable development of all parts of the State. KNO representatives explained the rationale behind their demands, which were primarily aimed at more autonomy to the hill areas inhabited by them. We initially wanted the militants to stay in designated camps and sign a Suspension of Operations (SoO) with the Manipur Government.” Demand for equitable development of all parts of the State is reasonable as any disparity leads to tensions. Further, there is room for granting more autonomy to the autonomous district councils in the hill areas in the lines viable to Panchayats and Municipalities under 93rd and 94th Constitution Amendments so that people take care of their own affairs. Too much centralization of power breeds discontent and there is a tendency to blame the authority concerned.
The intention of signing SoO by the Union and State Governments with Kuki-Zo armed groups could be to avoid armed conflict. The scope and terms of SoO agreement have been breached by the latter in the aftermath of eviction of an unauthorized village in reserved forest by the State Government of Manipur in March, 2023. Consequently, Manipur Government unilaterally decided to withdraw from SoO agreement.
However, the Union Government sees SoO agreement in a different perspective, and it remains ambivalent since its expiry on the 29th February, 2024. The State Assembly of Manipur unanimously decided to abrogate SoO in its session without ten Kuki MLAs. The pros and cons of SoO agreement depends on which side of the fence one stands.
Why did the Kuki-Zo community members form about thirty armed groups in Manipur since late 1980s ? Were they set up with the objective to create a separate territory from the Union of India outside India or to set up a separate Union Territory within Manipur State. It has been repeatedly heard from many Kuki leaders, especially, Dr Seilen Haokip, spokesperson of Kuki National Organization that Kukis are not against the Union Government and what they seek is a Separate Administration from the State Government of Manipur. In order to display loyalty publicly to the Union of India, Kuki people have been waving the National flag at any protest demonstrations since the violence erupted between Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities on the 3rd May, 2023.
In late 1980s and early 1990s when some Kuki-Zo youths armed themselves with sophisticated weapons, general assumption is that they would be fighting against the security forces as the Naga and Meitei armed youths have been engaging the Central forces.
It is common in Manipur to see armed groups extort money from contractors, businessmen, employees, transporters, etc in the name of purported separatist movement to achieve independence from the Union of India. Out of fear of consequences for non-compliance with monetary demands, many who receive demand letters enter into negotiation with cadres of the armed groups to arrive at a settlement. In the event of non-payment, there have been instances where “punishments” have been meted out to those reluctant persons.
Shri Jarnail Singh, who was Chief Secretary of Manipur Government from 2004 to 2008, and who was actively involved in negotiation with Kuki militant groups, Kuki National Organization (KNO) and United Peoples Front (UPF) mentions at page 149 of his book, “My Tryst with Manipur: A Memoir” as “There were about a dozen Kuki militant groups operating in Manipur. Most of the time, they were responsible for hold-ups on highways and extortion threats to contractors. But these groups had not raised any secessionist demand. So, New Delhi felt there was a need to hold talks and redress their genuine grievances. It was decided that the talk should be between the State Government and Kuki militant groups.”
Funding of the Kuki-Zo militant groups could be from diverse sources. Drug trafficking from Myanmar to Manipur and further to other parts of India onwards has been going on for many decades. The open and porous border of 398 kms between Manipur and Myanmar has been used for trafficking of contraband items like arms, drugs, wild life products, gold and precious stones, etc. by people belonging to all communities in Manipur. It is not hard to conclude that anybody who is at the routes of illegal trade would have collected their share from the profit of the trade. Illegal trade help both traffickers and extortionist to enrich themselves. The incentive to set up a new armed militant group to extort money with meagre investment in arms was known to any discerning eye and as such there are now about thirty armed militant groups belonging to Kuki-Zo community. Out of the thirty, about twenty-five are in suspension of operation.
A relevant question to be asked is as to why Assam Rifles, which has presence in large number in Manipur, guarding the border with Myanmar chose to enter into a ceasefire with armed Kuki-Zo militants under the name and style of Suspension of Operation in 2005.
In fact, a ceasefire is a treaty between two warring groups to facilitate negotiations for a settlement between the parties involved. It has been made abundantly clear that Kuki-Zo militants were not secessionists, and perhaps had not attacked Central or State security forces before the signing of SoO agreements with Assam Rifles. On the other hand, both Naga and Meitei armed groups have been engaged in violence resulting in casualty to security personnel till ceasefire agreements are signed. Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) after several rounds of negotiations with emissaries of the Government of India in foreign countries, entered into ceasefire with the latter on the 1st August, 1997.
The cease-fire has been extended periodically for one year each time to allow negotiations to take place between the Government of India and NSCN (IM). The movement of the armed Nagas has been recognized as a political problem, which should be addressed through political dialogue. If the Kuki-Zo armed groups were not demanding secession from the Union of India, and if they were not engaged in any form of violence against the Central security forces like Army and Assam Rifles, what prompted Assam Rifles to sign SoO agreement with them in 2005. It may be recalled that during the Kuki-Naga clashes from 1993 to 1997, armed groups of both communities were on the forefront to protect their villages or attack on the villages of other community. Armed groups of Kuki-Zo communities emerged as protectors of their community and defence force against future conflict with other community. They earned respectability from the members of their community and justified their existence amidst them.
What does Assam Rifles achieve by signing SoO with Kuki-Zo armed groups ? The hands of Assam Rifles were full in 2005 with several Meitei insurgent groups operating from Myanmar could attack them. There were instances of a few skirmishes of Assam Rifles with cadres of NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) in the hills of Manipur and Nagaland. They have to weigh the pros and cons of signing a ceasefire with some twenty-five Kuki-Zo militants groups operating in Kangpokpi, Churachand-pur, Chandel, Tengnoupal and Moreh areas. They would have realized that these groups were not secessionist in their approach. However, they could turn secessionist when they gain more strength in future. In order to nip the possible secessionist movement in the bud, it makes sense for Assam Rifles to enter into a ceasefire, where the arms and ammunition of the armed groups are kept away under lock and key at designated camps, which would be monitored by them from time to time. Only cost to Union Government under the SoO agreement is one-time payment of a lump-sum amount to each cadre to start a new life in the mainstream and monthly payment of a paltry amount of about Rs 5000-6000. The benefits of ceasefire far outweigh the costs.
While the political aspects of SoO have not been explicitly spelt out in the agreement, both the Union Government and armed Kuki-Zo militants had perhaps tacit understanding about political demand for formation of a new Kukiland out of Manipur. This has been made clear by the utterances of political leaders of ruling party and armed Kuki-Zo groups. However, it was made explicit in the SoO agreement that there would be no demand for disintegration of Manipur.
With regard to the first negotiations with KNO and UPF, Shri Jarnail Singh, former Chief Secretary of Manipur Govern- ment mentions at ibid page 150, as “The KNO wanted the discussion with a representative of the Home Ministry but we (team led by Chief Secretary) were firm that they needed to speak to a team led by Chief Secretary of Manipur only. The talks centred on general issues of equitable development of all parts of the State. KNO representatives explained the rationale behind their demands, which were primarily aimed at more autonomy to the hill areas inhabited by them. We initially wanted the militants to stay in designated camps and sign a Suspension of Operations (SoO) with the Manipur Government.” Demand for equitable development of all parts of the State is reasonable as any disparity leads to tensions. Further, there is room for granting more autonomy to the autonomous district councils in the hill areas in the lines viable to Panchayats and Municipalities under 93rd and 94th Constitution Amendments so that people take care of their own affairs. Too much centralization of power breeds discontent and there is a tendency to blame the authority concerned.
The intention of signing SoO by the Union and State Governments with Kuki-Zo armed groups could be to avoid armed conflict. The scope and terms of SoO agreement have been breached by the latter in the aftermath of eviction of an unauthorized village in reserved forest by the State Government of Manipur in March, 2023. Consequently, Manipur Government unilaterally decided to withdraw from SoO agreement.
However, the Union Government sees SoO agreement in a different perspective, and it remains ambivalent since its expiry on the 29th February, 2024. The State Assembly of Manipur unanimously decided to abrogate SoO in its session without ten Kuki MLAs. The pros and cons of SoO agreement depends on which side of the fence one stands.